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Abstract
We examine the impacts of alternative cap-and-trade allowance allocation designs in a model of the
U.S. economy where price-regulated electric utilities generate 30% of total CO2 emissions. Our empir-
ical model embeds a generator-level description of electricity production—comprising all 16,891 electric-
ity generators in the contiguous U.S.—in a multi-region multi-sector general equilibrium framework that
features regulated monopolies and imperfectly competitive wholesale electricity markets. The model rec-
ognizes the considerable heterogeneity among households incorporating all 15,588 households from the
Consumer and Expenditure Survey as individual agents in the model. Depending on the stringency of the
policy, we find that distributing emission permits freely to regulated utilities increases welfare cost by 40-
80% relative to an auction if electricity rates do not reflect the opportunity costs of permits. Despite an
implicit subsidy to electricity prices, efficiency costs are disproportionately borne by households in the
lowest income deciles.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, market-based “cap-and-trade” (CAT) regulation has become a
centerpiece of environmental policy in the U.S and in Europe. While both emissions taxes and
CAT regulations minimize compliance costs through equalization of marginal abatement costs
across sources, CAT regulation is flexible with respect to the initial allocation of property rights
over the cap (Stavins, 2008). Allowances can be auctioned to generate revenues to the state, thus
providing a close counterpart to an emissions tax. Since allowances are valuable assets, a free
distribution to emissions sources could be used to compensate regulatory compliance costs by
generating windfall profits (Goulder et al., 2010). In a frictionless world with no pre-existing
distortions, the initial allocation of allowances does not affect the efficiency of the policy (Coase,
1960; Montgomery, 1972). However, the allocation of allowances determines the distributional
outcome of the policy, making it a politically contentious issue.
In the U.S., the electricity sector features a large number of regional monopolies that generate
near 60% of total electric power and emit around 30% of economy-wide carbon dioxide (CO2).
To protect electricity consumers, public utility commissions (PUC) regulate electricity rates on an
cost-of-service basis (Joskow, 2006), so that output prices will reflect the carbon price only if the
CAT policy affects operation costs. Freely allocating allowances to regulated electricity producers
would implicitly subsidize electricity rates for a subset of consumers, reducing incentives for
electricity conservation and shifting abatement efforts to other sectors of the economy. By
preventing electricity rates to reflect the opportunity cost of permits, PUCs would protect
electricity consumers from large price increases.1 If the value of free allowances received by
regulated firms is instead passed on to consumers as lump-sum transfers, or if allowances are
auctioned, electricity rates would fully reflect the carbon price signal, restoring the efficiency
property of the policy.2 Hence in the presence of price-regulated firms, the efficiency of CAT
regulation may not be independent from the initial allowance allocation.
This paper empirically investigates the efficiency and distributional impacts of CAT regulation
in the U.S. in the presence of cost-of-service regulation in the electricity sector. We focus on two
design elements of CAT regulation: (i) the method of allowance allocation; and (ii) the baseline
used to allocate allowances. To examine ex-ante how the value of allowances is transmitted in the
economy, we employ a general equilibrium representation of the U.S. economy that captures key
interactions between electricity generation technologies, price-regulated firms, structural changes
across sectors and regions, pre-existing taxes and government budget constraint, as well as
household heterogeneity.
1 Similarly, free permits allocated during the first phase of the European Emission Trading Scheme led to state inter-
vention directed at mitigating electricity price increases (Radov and Klevnas, 2007; Sijm et al., 2008; Shuttleworth
and Antstey, 2012).
2 There are some legitimate behavioral questions about how consumers will respond to a lump-sum transfer. Even if
the PUC passes on the value of allowances independently from the amount of electricity consumed, associating
such payment with electricity bills could still induce some distortions in consumption behavior. A CAT program
where allowances are auctioned would avoid this issue altogether, but brings up the wider question of revenue
recycling (see, for example, Goulder et al., 1999).
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Our modeling framework makes two methodological contributions. First, we embed a detailed
representation of electricity generation in an economy-wide model representing aggregate
economic activities, where the portfolio of generation technologies is based on all 16,891
generators active in 2006 (Energy Information Agency (EIA), 2007b). We identify 319 operators
subject to cost-of-service regulation with significant generation capacity (EIA, 2007d), and model
production decisions at the operator level. Generators owned by non-regulated operators compete
on regional wholesale electricity markets that approximate the geographical coverage of the
regional transmission organizations (RTOs). On each wholesale market, large operators are
modeled as strategic Cournot players interacting with a competitive fringe.3 Second, we
incorporate data on all 15,588 households from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), a
representative sample of the U.S. population (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 2006), with
individual households’ decisions stemming from a constrained utility maximization problem.
Integrating real households as individual agents enables us to assess both sources and uses side
effects of income in a general equilibrium setting and quantifies household-level welfare impacts
using well defined welfare indexes.4
This paper complements a number of existing studies. Pau employ a partial equilibrium
dynamic model for the U.S. electricity sector to study alternative allowance allocation schemes.
The model is based on 21 aggregate regions among which 12 regions are subject to
cost-of-service regulation. Their framework suggests that freely allocating allowances in an
electricity-only CAT would increase the price of allowances by 12% compared to an auction.
Using the same partial equilibrium model, Burtraw et al. (2001) suggest that welfare costs from
freely allocating allowances would be two times higher than under auctioning. Our framework
improves upon these results with general equilibrium economy-wide welfare costs projections,
and overcomes limitations inherent in a Marshallian demand formulation typically employed in
partial equilibrium electricity models. Metcalf et al. (2010) examine distributional effects of
carbon policies by focusing on how energy expenditure shares differ across income groups. In
contrast, we consider not only the uses side effects of income but also the ways that the
government’s disposition of carbon revenue influences the distribution of policy impacts and
affects the source side of income.
Our analysis is also germane to strands of both industrial organization and environmental
economics literature that study interactions between PUC regulation and market-based
environmental regulation. Theoretical work by Bohi and Burtraw (1992), Coggins and Smith
(1993) and Fullerton et al. (1997) show that cost-of-service regulation can induce inefficient
investment behavior. The impact of price regulation on compliance decisions is confirmed by
empirical studies. In the context of the Clean Air Act, Arimura (2002) finds that PUCs in
3 Although this is not the primary focus of this paper, the degree of competition on output markets is an important
determinant of the outcome of market-based environmental policy (Malueg, 1990; Sartzetakis, 1997; Mansur,
2007b; Fowlie, 2009).
4 See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for a discussion of tax incidence impacts in the public finance literature
differentiating uses and sources side of income effects.
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Figure 1. Market equilibrium, allowance allocation, and price regulation.
high-sulfur coal mining regions favored the use of high-sulfur coal, and that uncertain PUCs
rulings mitigated incentives for allowance trading. In the NOx Budget Program, Fowlie (2010)
shows that regulated operators were more likely to invest in capital-intensive abatement
technologies due to guaranteed rates of return. While a distinctive feature of CO2 emissions is the
absence of end-of-pipe abatement technologies, our results further support the view that the
discretionary power of PUCs is a key factor in the efficiency of CAT regulations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a simple graphical illustration of the central
issue of this paper. Section 3 provides some background about electricity markets’ structure and
carbon intensity of electricity production in the U.S. Section 4 describes our modeling framework.
Section 5 lays out the policy scenarios and reports simulation results. Section 6 concludes.
2. ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION AND OUTPUT PRICE REGULATION: A GRAPHICAL
ILLUSTRATION
If output markets are subject to price regulation, allowance allocation design can impact the
outcome of a CAT environmental policy. Figure 1 helps to convey the intuition about different
policy designs.
Consider a monopolist with prices regulated to reflect average production costs in a partial
equilibrium setting. In the initial equilibrium without environmental regulation, the output price
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and level are P and Q, respectively. These are determined by the intersection of the market
demand with the average cost schedule (AC) of the regulated monopolist. In order to focus on
demand-side effects, assume a fixed rate of emissions per unit of output, denoted by e, yielding
total benchmark emissions E.
A CAT policy that sets a cap on total emissions and requires sources to surrender allowances to
cover their emissions gives rise to an emission price PC . If allowances are auctioned, expenditures
on allowances increase production costs, shifting the supply curve upwards (AC + PC × e). The
new equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗) associated with emissions E∗ fully reflects emissions price PC .
If allowances are freely allocated, the value represented by the shaded area Π in the
bottom-left quadrant has to be passed forward to consumers. If Π is transferred to consumers as a
lump-sum transfer, relative prices are not affected and equilibrium (P ∗, Q∗, E∗) prevails. If Π is
instead passed to the consumers through output prices, or if the intent of the legislation to have
rates reflect the full CO2 costs is frustrated by PUC rate setting, consumers misperceive the true
value of output. The equilibrium is then characterized by a price P ≤ P ∗, and consumer behavior
is distorted resulting in an output level Q ≥ Q∗ and associated emissions E ≥ E∗. In turn, under
a CAT regulation that covers all sectors of the economy, higher emissions from regulated firms
mean that higher abatement is required in other sectors in order to meet the cap, which will
increase compliance costs.
The relevance of this problem for policy design is an empirical question. In the context of
U.S. climate policy, the extent to which the efficiency of CAT regulation is affected by alternative
allowance allocation methods depends on the share of emissions stemming from regulated firms,
on the response of electricity consumers, as well as abatement opportunities at regulated
electricity producers and in other economic activities. Additionally, the differences among
regions in terms of their electricity markets’ structure and carbon intensity are important drivers
of the regional incidence of welfare costs.
3. ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND CO2 EMISSIONS IN THE U.S.
Historically, the U.S. electricity sector developed through state-regulated regional monopolies,
in which generation, transmission and distribution were vertically integrated. The most widely
used form of regulation has been ‘rate of return’ regulation, where rates are set by PUCs to allow
utilities to recover prudently incurred operating costs, so that consumers pay a price comparable
to the average accounting cost of service. In the 1970s, a movement of deregulation took place
across numerous regulated industries (Winston, 1993), and the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act in 1978 provided initial legal support for a separation of generation from transmission. In
addition, limited economies of scale in modern generation technologies, and technological
advances in high-voltage transmission technologies increased opportunities for mutually
beneficial trades to take place in a highly balkanized system (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983).
Through the regulatory and technological evolution, the traditional regional monopolies were
progressively complemented by investor-owned independent power producers that had no
network ownership and directly supplied large industrial activities. This situation created a
demand from other industrial consumers to be able to purchase current from different electricity
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Figure 2. State-level aggregation of national electric power market regions.
supplier, particularly in areas with high electricity prices (Joskow, 2005). Through the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was granted a right to
order electric utilities to have electric current to transit on their network, implicitly inviting
market transactions to take place on the network for a fee. In 1999, the FERC called for the
creation of RTOs in order to provide independent supervision of transmission grids.
As of 2006, the base year of our model and data set, the continental electric power market can
be divided into 10 regions, most of which have transferred the administration of transmission
networks to an independent system operator (ISO) to supervise wholesale market transactions.5
Figure 2 approximates the 10 power market regions by state-level borders (see Appendix A for
the actual coverage of electricity regions and their acronyms). Table 1 reports electricity
generation by power market region for 2006 and regional shares of electricity generated by
independent electricity producers and traditional vertically integrated electric utilities (EIA,
2007d).6
Despite a trend towards competitive wholesale markets, around 60% of electric power is
generated by traditional vertically integrated utilities. At the regional level, electric power in
SEAST, SPP and MOUNT is almost entirely generated by regulated operators. The number of
regulated operators shows large variations in the structure of regulated electricity production, with
SPP and MISO featuring a large number of operators with small generation capacity. Regions
such as NY and CA feature a small number of regulated operators with large, mainly
5 This process is still ongoing and the coverage of ISOs and RTOs are expanding, although the pace of market liberal-
ization slowed down after the electricity crisis in California in 2000–2001.
6 Note that while state-border aggregation is an approximation of true geographical coverage of transmission regions,
each regulated and non-regulated operator is mapped to its correct wholesale market or region.
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Table 1. Regional electricity generation, market structure and CO2 intensity in 2006.
Region Generation Regulated generation Non-regulated generation
(TWh) % Na tCO2/MWh % Nb HHIc tCO2 /MWh
SEAST 1,126.6 87.0 87 0.61 13.0 287 310 0.60
SPP 142.4 86.2 133 0.78 13.8 30 1,570 0.42
MOUNT 214.1 85.7 38 0.73 14.3 57 1,160 0.38
NWPP 317.4 79.5 64 0.38 20.5 154 1,130 0.63
MISO 724.4 67.7 305 0.85 32.3 315 1,680 0.47
CA 231.3 49.8 39 0.19 50.2 317 220 0.42
PJM 665.0 35.5 51 0.79 64.5 259 580 0.58
NY 142.9 29.6 14 0.30 70.4 148 550 0.37
ERCOT 348.9 13.2 20 0.84 86.8 157 820 0.52
NENGL 132.8 4.8 28 0.79 95.2 214 510 0.40
US-wide 4045.7 61.2 731 0.65 38.8 1938 – 0.51
Notes: a Number of traditional vertically integrated electric utilities. b Number of independent electric power
producers. c Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Sources: Authors’ own calculations. Data on generation and operator’s
regulatory status is from EIA Form 906-920 (2007d). CO2 emissions are based on fuel consumption for each
operator (EIA Form 906-920, 2007d) and fuel-specific CO2 emissions factors (EIA, 2009a).
hydroelectric capacity. In the state of Texas, where most electricity producers have joined the
ERCOT market, some 20 regulated monopolies are active within state borders.
Non-regulated operators include independent power producers as well as co-generators that
sell surplus power generated for the purpose of their primary industrial activity.7 While there are
several limitation of conventional market concentration indexes to measure imperfect competition
on non-storable goods markets (Borenstein et al., 1999), there exists strong empirical evidence
that U.S. wholesale electricity markets are best described as oligopolies (for example, Wolak,
2003; Mansur, 2007a; Puller, 2007; Sweeting, 2007; Bushnell et al., 2008). With
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHI) of over 1,000, wholesale production in regions with a low
share of non-regulated production (MISO, MOUNT, NWWP, and SPP) exhibit the highest
concentration. Conversely, in regions with a high share of generation from non-regulated
operators, the HHI provides evidence of lower concentration on wholesale markets.
Carbon intensity of electricity generation from regulated operators is on average (for the whole
U.S.) 27% higher than for non-regulated operators, but large variations exist at the regional level.
Electricity produced from regulated operators in NENGL and ERCOT emits almost twice as
much CO2 per MWh as compared to non-regulated operators. This is because non-regulated
operators in these regions own a large share of low-carbon gas-fired plants. For three out of ten
7 Note that regulated operators supply their customers directly but also operate on their regional wholesale market,
either to purchase or sell power. The key feature of regulated operators is that they have a monopoly for selling
power to their consumers with rates subject to approval by regulatory commission.
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regions (i.e. CA, NWPP, and NY) the carbon intensity of non-regulated operators is higher
relative to regulated operators, as the latter mainly hold hydro capacity.
Differences in carbon intensity across operators together with the substantial heterogeneity in
the market structure of the U.S. electricity sector imply that the allowance allocation design of
CAT regulation is a key determinant for the efficiency and distributional consequences of the
policy.
4. BENCHMARK DATA, MODELING FRAMEWORK AND COMPUTATIONAL STRAT-
EGY
We employ a numerical model of the U.S. economy to examine further the issues of free
allowance distribution in the presence of price-regulated markets in a more realistic setting. The
additional realism includes a detailed representation of regional electricity markets’
structure—including regulated markets that are subject to cost-of-service regulation as well as
imperfectly competitive regional wholesale markets—and a generator-level formulation of
electricity production embedded in a multi-region general equilibrium (GE) representation of the
U.S. economy. We further incorporate a large number of heterogeneous household as individual
agents in the model. The GE framework allows us to characterize abatement options in
non-electric sectors, assess income and factor price changes, and assess distributional impacts
through theoretically sound welfare cost indices.
4.1 Electricity Generation
4.1.1 Data
Electricity generation is based on a comprehensive data set of 16,891 generators active in
2006. Information on capacity, generation technology and multiple energy sources used is taken
from EIA Form 860 (2007b). Appendix A provides a list of generation technologies and fuels.8
Each generator is matched to monthly output and fuel consumption data at the plant level reported
in EIA Form 906-920 (2007d).9 EIA Form 906-920 also provides information about the operator
of each plant, including its regulatory status and region of operation. Our final data thus contains
information about the generation technology portfolio of each operator and its regulatory status,
i.e. whether it is a traditional vertically integrated electric utility or an independent operator, and
on observed output and fuel consumption at the plant level.
The cost function of generator g is composed of a constant marginal cost cg (in $/MWh)
comprising fuel costs and variable O&M costs. First, fuel costs are based on a plant-specific heat
rate (MBTU/MWh) that is calculated using fuel consumption and electricity output reported in
EIA Form 906-920 (2007d) and state-level fuel prices for 2006 ($/MBTU, from EIA, 2009c). We
8 We obtain the dependable capacity by scaling installed capacity figures from EIA Form 860 (2007b) with technology-
specific availability data reported in the Generating Availability Report by the North American Electric Reliability
Council.
9 A plant can include multiple generators. Information on output and fuel consumption at the generator level is not
available.
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Table 2. Distribution of market sizes for regulated operators with annual generation > 10 GWh.
Region Number of Market size: summary statistics (GWh/year)
operators Mean Median Min Max IQRa
SEAST 58 16,897 3,334 19 155,170 16,700
MOUNT 17 10,796 3,502 17 55,129 13,765
PJM 27 8,748 650 13 67,686 9,655
NWPP 39 6,472 696 13 55,049 6,580
MISO 80 6,130 354 16 50,864 6,238
SPP 26 4,719 602 19 24,615 5,681
NY 10 4,233 448 25 27,308 2,388
CA 34 3,384 649 23 33,191 1,708
ERCOT 17 2,702 529 10 15,277 3,402
NENGL 11 575 176 11 4,583 235
Notes: a Interquartile range. Sources: Authors’ own calculations based on EIA Form 906-920, (2007d).
assume that if a given plant includes multiple generators of the same technology, these share the
same efficiency. Carbon emissions rates (tCO2/MWh) are calculated on the heat rate and the CO2
content of the fuel (tCO2/MBTU) from EIA (2008). Second, as O&M costs ($/MWh) are not
observed at the plant level, we use technology-specific data from EIA (2009b) that includes labor,
capital, material and waste disposition costs per unit of output.
Given the portfolio of generators, production decisions are modeled at the operator level. We
distinguish two types of operators: (1) regulated regional monopolists, and (2) non-regulated
operators selling power on one of ten regional wholesale markets. We now discuss these in turn.
4.1.2 Representation of Regulated Electricity Markets
We consider f = 1, . . . , 319 regulated operators with annual output greater than 10 GWh
according to EIA Form 906-920 (2007d), which corresponds approximately to operators with
customer demand of 1,000 households or more.10 Table 2 provides information on the number of
regulated operators and the distribution of market size in each region. The market size of
regulated operators varies drastically both across and within regions. In all regions, the
distribution is highly skewed to the right, i.e. there are relatively few operators with a large market
size.
Each regulated operator is modeled as a regional monopoly, with monthly benchmark demand
10 Generation from the 412 regulated operators that are not included in the model represents less than 0.1% of elec-
tricity generated in each region.
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given by observed monthly output as reported in EIA Form 906-920 (2007d).11 To capture limited
substitution possibilities of electricity generated at different times in the year, as neither the
supply of electricity nor the demand for electricity services can easily be shifted across time,
yearly demand is divided into nine time slices. First, we aggregate data on monthly demand into
three seasons (summer, winter and fall/spring). Second, observed fluctuations of the physical
demand for electricity are captured by dividing each season into three load blocks (peak,
intermediate, and base load) with region and season-specific load distribution data (EIA, 2009b).
Each regulated operator is assumed to minimize generation costs to meet the electricity
demand. Thus a generator g owned by a regulated operator is only active in load segment t if its
marginal generation cost cg is lower than the cost of the marginal generator Cft used to cover the
demand. For generators listed with multiple fuel options in the data, the fuel choice is
endogenous.
Formally, in equilibrium the “zero profit” condition for each generator and load segment
exhibits complementarity slackness with the output level Y gt :
cg + νgτ + µgt ≥ Cft ⊥ Y gt ≥ 0 (1)
where the ⊥ operator indicates a complementary relationship, νg is the carbon intensity, which
integrates the efficiency of the generator and fuel-specific carbon content, and τ denotes the price
of carbon. µgt represents the shadow value of installed capacity, and it is the complementarity
variable of the capacity constraint of each generator:
Y gt ≤ κgt ⊥ µgt ≥ 0 , (2)
where κgt is the dependable capacity of generator g in load segment t. The equilibrium marginal
generation cost Cft is determined by a market clearing condition for each load segment:∑
g∈Gf
Y gt ≥ dft ⊥ Cft ≥ 0 , (3)
where Gf and d
f
t denotes the set of generators owned by regulated operators f and the electricity
demand at the regulated operator in time t, respectively.
Given the benchmark demand at each operator d
f
t , we simulate benchmark output of each
generator Y
g
t by solving expressions (1) to (3) as a MCP. In the benchmark the carbon price is
zero and the price of electricity at regulated operator f is the yearly average generation cost.
Specifically, since a majority of consumers face a nearly constant price for electricity, we assume
that the price signal transmitted to consumers is updated once a year to reflect yearly average
11 Our model focuses on generation rather than retail decisions, and we are concerned with the pricing rule of operators.
This formulation does not rule out that regulated operators might be active on wholesale markets. For example,
a regional monopolist could purchase power on the wholesale market to supply their customers. In this case, the
customer will pay the wholesale price. If the regulated operator sells power on the wholesale market, customers
on the wholesale market will pay the average cost of production.
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generation costs:
P
f
=
∑
g∈Gf
∑
t Y
g
t c
g
D
f
, (4)
where D
f
=
∑
t d
f
t is the total yearly demand for generation at operators f in the benchmark.
Note that the capacity rents µgt are not included in the price.
Under a carbon policy, generation costs increase proportionally with the emissions coefficient
νgt . Changes in relative generation costs induce a reordering of the generators at each regulated
operator, and the price transmitted to the consumer is given by:
P f =
∑
g∈Gf
∑
t Y
g
t c
g + νgt τ
Df
− sf +
∑
t
ϕft . (5)
The key component of equation (5) is a firm-specific endogenous subsidy rate sf , which equals
the value of free allowances received by operator f , denoted Vf , divided by total yearly output:
sf =
Vf
Df
. (6)
Subsidizing the price of output for operators with a sufficiently low carbon intensity can result in
an overall price decrease, i.e. P f < P
f
.12
The demand response at operator f is given by a linear function calibrated at the price P
f
and
demand D
f
:
Df = D
f
(
1 + 
(
P f
P
f
− 1
))
, (7)
where  < 0 is the local price elasticity of demand. At the benchmark price P f = P
f
, aggregate
benchmark demand for firm f is thus given by D
f
. Assuming that the shape of the load profile is
unchanged, demand at time t is given by dft = Df d
f
t /D
f
.
Note that the linear function only serves as a local approximation of (non-linear) GE demand.
As further discussed below, the electricity production model is integrated in the GE setting by
sequentially updating P
f
and D
f
based on GE estimates.
4.1.3 Representation of Wholesale Electricity Markets
Data on monthly generation by non-regulated operators is aggregated at the regional level and
represents the demand for wholesale power generation in each region. As for the regulated
12 If demand exceeds total available capacity, then the price includes capacity rents ϕft :
dft ≤
∑
g∈Gf
κgt ⊥ ϕft ≥ 0 .
In reality, these rents are likely to be transferred to investors. Due to computational reasons we include these rents
in the price.
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Table 3. Characteristics of regional wholesale markets.
Region Cournot Fringe Price ($/MWh) CO2 intensity (tCO2 /MWh)
operatorsa operators Observed Simulated Observed Simulated
NWPP 11 143 50.2 48.6 0.63 0.62
SEAST 9 278 58.1 53.5 0.60 0.61
PJM 20 239 55.1 52.2 0.58 0.58
ERCOT 6 151 52.9 57.5 0.52 0.50
MISO 10 305 44.0 47.7 0.47 0.50
SPP 6 24 55.4 63.6 0.42 0.43
CA 12 305 48.9 48.7 0.42 0.34
NENGL 15 199 60.8 61.5 0.40 0.36
MOUNT 11 46 57.4 44.9 0.38 0.35
NY 17 131 70.2 71.2 0.37 0.36
Notes: a Number of regulated operators in regional wholesale markets holding more than 3% of generation capacity.
Sources: Observed price is a load-weighted average reported by FERC for 2006; Observed CO2 emissions are based
on fuel consumption at for each operator (EIA Form 906-920, 2007d) and fuel-specific CO2 emission factors (EIA,
2009a).
operators, monthly wholesale demand is aggregated into three seasons and shared across peak,
intermediate, and base load segments. In each regional wholesale market r = 1, . . . , 10, all
generators of non-regulated operators compete to meet the demand. Electricity output by each
generator is determined by the following zero profit condition:
−pigt ≥ 0 ⊥ Y gt ≥ 0 . (8)
Market structure on regional wholesale markets is based on Bushnell et al. (2008) and Fowlie
(2009). We model large operators as oligopolists, and assume that operators holding more than
3% of wholesale generation capacity behave as Cournot players and accordingly price output
above marginal cost. Table 3 reports the number of Cournot players in each region. Smaller
operators act as a competitive fringe and are assumed to be price takers. Let prt denote the
wholesale price in load block t and Drt (p
r
t )
−1 the inverse demand function. The Cournot-Nash
equilibrium unit profit function for strategic players (denoted by the set Gcournotr ) and non-strategic
players (denoted by the set Gfringer ) are then given by, respectively:
pigt =
{
prt +
∂Dr(prt )
−1
∂Y gt
− cg − µgt − νgt τ if g ∈ Gcournotr
prt − cg − µgt − νgt τ if g ∈ Gfringer .
(9)
Note that in addition to the Cournot rents, independent operators who own generators with
marginal cost below the market price earn capacity rents µgt measuring the value of the installed
capacity per unit of output (see equation 2).
In each time period, the wholesale price reflects (a function of) the generation costs of the
marginal producer used to cover the demand. In equilibrium, prt is orthogonal to the market
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clearing condition:∑
g∈Gr
Y gt ≥ drt ⊥ prt ≥ 0 , (10)
where Gr is the full set of generators in wholesale market r. As for regulated operators the
wholesale price transmitted to consumers is constant over the year, and is given by an
output-weighted average of the wholesale price in each load segment:
P r =
1∑
t d
r
t
∑
t
prtd
r
t . (11)
The demand for non-regulated operators is locally approximated by a calibrated linear demand
function:
Dr = D
r
(
1 + 
(
P r
P
r − 1
))
, (12)
with drt = D
r d
r
t/D
r
.
4.2 Economy-wide Aggregate Economic Activities
4.2.1 Data
We use a comprehensive state-level energy-economy dataset that features a consistent
representation of energy markets in physical units as well as detailed accounts of regional
production and trade for 2006. Each state is described by a social accounting matrix (SAM) from
the 2006 IMPLAN (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2008) dataset which specifies benchmark
economic accounts and identifies 509 commodities as well as existing taxes, revenues and
transfers. This dataset only includes aggregate energy accounts for each state, and given our focus
we expand energy-related accounts with data on state-level energy balances and prices from the
2006 State Energy Data System (EIA, 2009d).13 Energy commodities identified in our study
include Coal (COL), Natural gas (GAS), Crude oil (CRU), Refined oil (OIL), and Electricity
(ELE), which allows us to distinguish energy goods and specify substitutability between fuels in
energy demand.
Our commodity aggregation identifies a further nine non-energy composites. We distinguish
Energy-intensive products (EIS) and a composite of Other manufacturing products (MAN),
Agriculture (AGR), Transportation (TRN), and Services (SRV). Primary factors in the dataset are
labor, capital, land, and fossil-fuel resources. We aggregate state-level data into 10 U.S. regions
that are identified in Figure 2 and approximately match wholesale transmission regions by
state-level border.14
13 The aggregation and reconciliation of IMPLAN state-level economic accounts needed to generate a micro-consistent
benchmark dataset which can be used for model calibration is accomplished using least-square optimization tech-
niques to minimize required adjustments.
14 Given our operator-level representation of regulated and non-regulated electricity markets, operators can be matched
to their appropriate region and hence discrepancies between state-level borders and wholesale markets geography
do not affect our analysis.
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Table 4. Sectoral CO2 emissions and regional emission intensity.
Region Total Sectoral share of emissions (%) Emission
emissions Electricity sector Non-electricity sectors intensity
(MtCO2) Wholesale Regulated AGR EIS SRV TRN OTH (tCO2/$)
ERCOT 639.9 27.8 6.5 1.0 26.5 2.6 32.2 3.4 0.71
SPP 204.1 5.3 45.1 3.2 8.9 3.1 30.1 4.3 0.65
SEAST 1335.3 5.9 43.0 0.8 10.6 1.3 36.4 2.0 0.52
MISO 1056.5 11.2 38.7 1.7 10.1 4.0 29.7 4.5 0.51
MOUNT 251.6 1.2 48.9 0.7 4.5 2.3 39.9 2.5 0.47
PJM 908.7 27.0 20.5 0.2 11.2 3.7 35.5 1.8 0.44
NWPP 313.0 13.8 30.0 1.9 5.5 2.2 44.8 1.8 0.43
NENGL 143.0 31.8 3.7 0.5 4.1 3.9 55.1 0.9 0.24
CA 359.0 9.6 5.6 0.7 6.9 3.9 67.7 5.7 0.23
NY 163.9 21.8 13.6 0.4 5.3 14.1 43.3 1.6 0.22
US-wide 5374.9 14.8 29.2 1.0 11.3 3.2 37.6 2.9 0.44
Sources: CO2 emissions from the electricity sector are based on simulated fuel consumption in the benchmark and
fuel-specific CO2 emission factors (EIA, 2009a). Emissions calculations for non-electricity sectors are based on
EIA’s State Energy Data System (SEDS) (EIA, 2009d). The calculation of emissions intensity is based on SEDS data
and economic value flows for industrial output from IMPLAN data (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2008).
Table 4 reports benchmark CO2 emissions, sectoral shares of total emissions, and total
emission intensity by region. CO2 emissions from electricity generation that is subject to
cost-of-service regulation represent about 30% of total economy-wide emissions, but large
regional variations exists. The second largest contributor to sectoral emissions is transportation
comprising here the industrial and private transportation sector. Finally, there exist significant
variation among regions with regard to emissions intensity of industrial output. By this metric,
ERCOT is by far the most CO2 intensive region, which can be attributed to large-scale activities
in energy intensive industries and oil refining.
4.2.2 Model Structure
Our analysis draws on a multi-commodity, multi-region comparative-static numerical general
equilibrium model of the U.S. economy (Rausch et al., 2010). Electricity generation is exogenous
and household decision-making is discussed in more detail below. In this section we outline key
structural assumptions of the model. Equilibrium conditions are reported in Appendix B.
Production technologies and firm behavior. For each industry (i = 1, . . . , I) in each region,
gross output Yi is produced using inputs of labor (Li), capital (Ki), natural resources including
coal, natural gas, crude oil, and land (Rzi, z = {1, . . . , Z}), and produced intermediate inputs
(xji, j = 1, . . . , I). All industries are characterized by constant returns to scale (except for fossil
fuels and agriculture, which are produced subject to decreasing returns to scale) and are traded in
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perfectly competitive markets (except for electricity, as described previously). Labor is assumed
to be fully mobile across industries in a given region but is immobile across U.S. regions, while
capital is mobile across regions and industries. Given the input prices gross of taxes, firms
maximize profits subject to the technology constraints by selling their products at a price equal to
marginal costs.
We employ constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions to characterize the production
technologies and distinguish three types of production activities in the model: primary energy
sectors (indexed by pe = {coal, gas, oil}), agriculture (indexed by agr), and non-resource based
industries (indexed by nr):15
Yi =

fi[KLEi(gi, Ei),Mi(x1i, . . . , xIi)] if i ∈ {nr}
fi[KLMi(gi,Mi), Rzi] if i ∈ {pe}
fi[REMi(Ri,EMi), gi(Ki, Li)] if i ∈ {agr} .
(13)
The supply response following a change in relative prices is driven by substitution among inputs,
and we use the nesting structure reported in Table 5. For example, the function fi for i ∈ {nr} is
given by:
f(KLE,M) = γf [αfKLEρf + (1− αf )Mρf ]1/ρf (14)
where γf , αf , and ρf are parameters. The parameter ρf is related to σf , the elasticity of
substitution between KLEi and Mi: ρf = (σf − 1)/σf . Elasticity parameters are reported in
Appendix A.
Table 5. Nested production structure
Function Description
Y = f(KLE,M) Output: non-resource using sectors
Y = f(KLM, R) Output: for primary energy sectors
Y = f(REM, g) Output: agricultural sector
KLE = KLE(g,E) Capital/labor-energy composite
KLM = KLE(g,M) Capital/labor-materials composite
REM = REM(R,EM) Resource-Energy/materials composite
EM = EM(E,M) Energy-materials composite
M = M(x1, . . . , xI) Materials composite
g = g(K,L) Capital-labor composite
E = E(xELE, h) Energy composite
h = h(xCOL, xGAS, xOIL) Coal-gas-oil composite
xi = xi(xDi, xDTi, xFTi) Domestic-imported inputs composite
I = I(x1, . . . , xI) Materials composite
Notes: All functions are CES in form.
15 For simplicity, we suppress the region index.
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Intra- and international trade. For a given region r, s = 1, . . . , R the elements xjr in the E
and M functions are Armington (1969) composites of locally, domestically, and foreign produced
varieties of Y goods:
xjr = γxj
(
αxjrxDjrρxjr + (1− αxjr)γTjr [βxjrxDTjrρTjr + (1− βxjr)xFTjrρTjr ]ρxjr/ρTjr
)1/ρxjr
(15)
where xDjr, xDTjr, and xFTjr denote local, domestic, and foreign inputs of type j in region r.
The parameter ρxjr is related to σxjr, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported
inputs: ρxjr = (σxjr − 1)/σxjr. Similarly, ρTjr = (σTjr − 1)/σTjr is related to the elasticity of
substitution between domestically and foreign made inputs.
Depending on the type of commodity, we distinguish three different representations of
intra-national regional trade:
xDTjr =

γxDTjr[
∑
s φxDTjr xDTjs
ρxDTjr ]1/ρxDTjr if j ∈ {ne}
xDTj if j ∈ {e}
xDTjp if j ∈ {ele} and r ∈ p .
(16)
First, imports of non-energy good ne by region r are a CES aggregate of varieties of the same
good produced in regions s = 1, . . . , R, s 6= r. Second, domestically traded non-electricity
energy goods e are assumed to be homogeneous products, i.e. there is a national pool that
demands domestic exports and supplies domestic imports. This assumption reflects the high
degree of integration of intra-U.S. markets for natural gas, crude and refined oil, and coal. Third,
we differentiate three regional electricity pools that are designed to provide an approximation of
the three asynchronous interconnects in the U.S.: the Eastern Interconnection, Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC), and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).16 We
assume that traded electricity ele is a homogeneous good within each regional pool p and that
there is no electricity trade between regional pools.
The U.S. economy as a whole is modeled as a large open economy, i.e. we assume that world
export demand and world imports supply functions for each traded good are elastic implying that
the U.S. can affect world market prices. Foreign closure of the model is determined through a
national balance-of-payments (BOP) constraint. Hence, the total value of U.S. exports equals the
total value of U.S. imports accounting for an initial BOP deficit given by 2006 statistics.
Investment and government demand. An aggregate investment good (I) is produced
combining Armington goods xir in a Leontief fashion:
Ir = min(I1r, . . . , Iir, . . . , IIr) . (17)
16 In terms of the regional aggregation described in Figure 2, the Eastern Interconnection thus comprises SPP, MISO,
SEAST, PJM, NY, and NENGL, and the WECC comprises CA, NWPP, and MOUNT.
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For later reference, let pIr =
∑
i αIirpir denote the price index (unit cost function) of I where αIir
is a parameter and pxir represents the price of the Armington good xir. Investment demands derive
from household utility maximization (see Section 4.3).
We incorporate various tax rates to capture interactions between environmental regulation and
the tax code. In each region, a single government entity approximates government activities at all
levels—federal, state, and local. Aggregate government consumption is represented by a Leontief
composite that combines Armington goods xir:
GPr = min(G1r, . . . , Gir, . . . , GIr) . (18)
The activities of the government sector in each region are purchasing goods and services, income
transfers, and raising revenues through taxes. The model includes ad-valorem output taxes,
corporate capital income taxes, and payroll taxes (employers’ and employees’ contribution). Thus
government income is given by: GOVr = TAXr −
∑
r Tr − Br, where TAX, Tr, and B are tax
revenue, transfer payments to households and the initial balance of payments. Aggregate demand
by the government is given by: GPr = GOVr/pGr where p
G
r is the price of aggregate government
consumption.
4.2.3 Electricity Transmission, Distribution and Market Integration
Integrating the multiple electricity markets into the top-down GE framework requires
determining how electricity prices from m = 1, . . . , 329 markets, comprising regulated markets
(f = 1, . . . , 319) and wholesale markets (r = 1, . . . , 10), are transmitted to each regional market
for electricity as represented in the GE model. In addition to the issue of price aggregation, the
question arises to what extent regulated and regional wholesale markets within each region are
integrated.17 Significant differences in regional electricity prices in the U.S. suggest that trade
opportunities among operators and markets are limited reflecting both the existing regulatory
structure and transmission constraints.
To represent barriers to market integration and allow for the aggregation of prices from
multiple markets, we assume monopolistic competition among regulated and non-regulated
operators. In our static setting with a fixed number of firms, monopolistic competition is
equivalent to assuming that supplies from different operators are imperfect substitutes.
Alternatively, treating electricity as a homogeneous good would require a structural model that
explicitly represents the physical electricity network. Given our operator-level representation of
the electric power sector, incorporating such detail would be hampered by data availability and
dimensionality constraints.
Our reduced-form approach posits that price differentiation (and aggregation) can be
represented by the following CES aggregator:
P rele =
[
θr
(
P r
P
r
)(1−σ)
+
∑
f∈r
θf
(
P f
P
f
)(1−σ)] 11−σ
, (19)
17 Note that inter-regional transfers of electricity are modeled according to an Armington trade formulation.
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where θr and θf denote the observed benchmark market share for the wholesale market in region
r and the regulated operator f , respectively. σ captures the degree of market integration.18 Our
base case assumption is “low integration” (σ = 1), and our analysis explores the implications of
independents markets (σ = 0.1) and a “high integration” case (σ = 10).
Reconciling both models also requires accounting for transmission and distribution costs (TDr)
which are not included in the electricity model but are contained in regional retail electricity
prices in the GE model (P rretail). We impute these as TD
r
= P
r
retail − P rele, where P rretail is the
observed benchmark retail price employed in the GE model and P
r
ele is an output-weighted
average of benchmark prices determined in the electricity generation model:
P
r
= (D
r
+
∑
f∈rD
f
)−1(D
r
P
r
+
∑
f∈rD
f
P
f
). We assume that TDr is fixed at its benchmark
level, i.e. transmission and distribution costs are assumed to be independent of the size of the
electricity sector. Finally, the retail price of electricity in region r is given by:
P rretail = P
r
eleP
r
ele + TD
r.
4.3 Household Behavior
4.3.1 Data
To capture household heterogeneity, we use the 2006 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), a
widely used source of data on consumption expenditures, income sources, and demographic
household characteristics (see, e.g., Attanasio, 1998, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2006,
and Metcalf et al., 2010) that is collected for the BLS. The CEX is designed to constitute a
representative sample of the U.S. population. In the following, we describe the necessary steps in
order to consistently integrate this data into our general equilibrium framework.
First, to obtain expenditure data that are consistent with the definition of consumption goods in
our macroeconomic data, we have to map CEX expenditure categories to North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) accounts. This is accomplished by first aggregating CEX
data into roughly 70 Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) categories, and then using a
bridge matrix from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007) to map expenditures from PCE to
NAICS categories.
Second, households with income above a certain level are “top-coded”, i.e. their income is
replaced with the national average. There are different thresholds for different types of income
(e.g., $150k for wage and salary income). At the household level, we see a substantial amount of
top-coding for the top 4% of the income distribution when pre-tax income reaches $250k. Note
that top-coding can make income go both up and down because the replacement value may be
higher than the real value. While we keep those households in the sample, this means that we
cannot break out the top 4% income class.
Third, a well-known issue with household survey data in general and with the CEX data in
particular is that capital income seems to be too low when compared to capital income based on
18 This structure assumes that trade opportunities among regulated operators and between each regulated operator and
the wholesale market are similar. We have experimented with more complex substitution patterns but have found
them to yield similar results as what is implied by Eq. (19).
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National Account data (e.g., Deaton, 2003, and Rutherford and Tarr, 2008). A second problem
with using CEX reported capital income is that it may misrepresent capital holdings across
income groups (Metcalf et al., 2010). There are two possible reasons. First, the CEX focuses
primarily on spending and the income data quality may not be as high quality as the spending
data. Second, if holdings of growth stocks are disproportionately held by higher income groups
then the CEX capital income measure will be biased towards more capital holdings in lower
income groups. Following Metcalf et al. (2010) we correct for this bias by incorporating data on
capital income shares by income decile from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).19
More specifically, we replace CEX reported capital income for each household by imputed capital
income based on capital income shares by income decile from SCF and total household income
from CEX. To accommodate changes in capital income while keeping CEX reported total income
fixed at the household level, we adjust labor income.
Fourth, imputing personal income tax rates based on reported tax payments and income in the
CEX sample results in tax rates that are significantly lower than observed personal income tax
rates. To address this issue we use data on 2006 average and marginal personal income tax rates
by income decile from the National Bureau of Economic Research’s tax simulator (Feenberg and
Coutts, 1993) for each household.
A final issue with the use of the CEX data is that for the purpose of including households in the
general equilibrium model, we need to ensure that income balance is satisfied in the benchmark
equilibrium. This condition requires that pre-tax household income is equal to the sum of
consumption expenditures, tax payments, and savings. As savings are not reported directly in the
CEX data, we impute savings as pre-tax household income minus the sum of consumption
expenditures and tax payments, and use this approach to close the income balance. For about 35%
of households in the sample, consumption expenditures exceed total household income, i.e. there
is not sufficient current income to finance observed consumption. As there does not seem to be a
perceivable pattern in the CEX data that would help to identify the type of income that falls short
of observed expenditures, we assume for these households that consumption in excess of
observable household income is financed by a stream of capital income. This approach ensures
that benchmark household consumption is consistent with reported data.
Table 6 shows expenditure shares for electricity and natural gas, and income shares for capital
and labor by annual income decile. The share of income from capital is slightly declining up to
the eighth decile at which point it begins to rise. The share of income from labor rises with
income up to the 8th decile after which it starts to decline slightly. The capital-labor ratio
generally decreases with income but sharply increases for the two top deciles.
19 One advantage of using the SCF is that it disproportionately samples wealthy families. Each survey consists of a
core representative sample combined with a high income supplement, which is drawn from the Internal Revenue
Service’s Statistics of Income data file. Further, the survey questionnaire consists of detailed questions on different
components of family wealth holdings. For these reasons, the SCF is widely acknowledged to be the best at
capturing both the wealth at the top of the distribution and the complete wealth portfolio of households in the
middle. Since the wealth distribution is highly skewed toward the top, most other surveys (like the CEX) that have
poor data on high income families tend to underreport measures of income and wealth.
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Table 6. Selected expenditure and income shares (%) and median household income (2006$) by annual
income decilea.
Income Electricity Natural Capital Labor Transfers Capital- Median
decile Gas labor ratio income
1 4.7 1.8 27.4 23.5 49.1 1.17 13,090
2 3.7 1.3 26.1 43.1 30.8 0.61 22,366
3 3.2 1.1 23.4 55.7 21.0 0.42 31,398
4 2.8 1.0 19.2 67.5 13.3 0.28 40,026
5 2.4 0.9 18.3 71.0 10.7 0.26 49,169
6 2.5 0.8 16.8 75.6 7.6 0.22 59,941
7 2.2 0.8 15.5 79.1 5.4 0.20 72,433
8 1.9 0.7 14.7 80.9 4.4 0.18 87,987
9 1.8 0.7 19.7 77.7 2.6 0.25 114,628
10 1.5 0.6 28.7 69.7 1.6 0.41 187,365
All 2.6 1.0 20.9 64.7 14.4 0.32 55,140
Notes: aPopulation-weighted within-income group averages based on benchmark data.
4.3.2 Utility Maximization Problem
Consumption, labor supply, and savings result from the decisions of h = 1, . . . , 15, 588
households, each maximizing its utility subject to an income constraint. Each household is
incorporated in the general equilibrium framework as a separate agent, i.e. we do not aggregate
preferences of individual households. Preferences for each household are calibrated based on
observed consumption from the CEX data. Besides preference heterogeneity, households also
differ with respect to their income shares.
Utility for each household is represented by a nested CES function that combines material
consumption, savings, and leisure thus making consumption-investment and labor supply
decisions endogenous. The nested utility structure is summarized in Table 7. The structure of
material consumption is specified to reflect econometric estimates of substitution possibilities
among energy and non-energy goods (Paltsev et al., 2005). At the top-level, a composite of
Armington goods (xih) and savings (qh) is combined with leisure (lh):
Uh = γch
(
αchCI(xih, qh)
1/ρch + (1− αch)l1/ρchh
)1/ρch
(20)
where CI is a CES composite of xih and qh, and where αch and ρch are parameters. The parameter
ρch is related to σch, the elasticity of substitution between CI and l: ρch = (σch − 1)/σch. We
assume that αch ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ σch ≤ ∞. We assume that utility from government spending is
additively separable with utility derived from private consumption. Given the the short-term
horizon of our analysis, we assume a constant savings rate and set σCS = 0. Following the
approach described in Ballard (2000), we calibrate σch to match an uncompensated
(compensated) labor supply elasticity of 0.1 (0.3).
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Table 7. Nested Utility Structure
Function Description
U = U(CI, l) Household utility
CI = CI(C, q) Consumption-investment composite
C = C(E,NE) Composite material consumption
E = E(x1, . . . , xI) , i ∈ {e} Energy consumption
NE = NE(x1, . . . , xI) , i ∈ {ne} Non-energy consumption
Notes: All functions are CES in form.
Household income is given by:
Mh = p
kωkh + p
l
rω
l
h +
∑
z
pzrω
z
h + Th (21)
where pk, plr, and p
z
r are prices for capital, labor, and resources, ω’s denote the initial endowment
of capital, labor (including leisure time), and resources, and Th is benchmark transfer income.
4.4 Computational Strategy
4.4.1 Calibration
Our integrated model replicates the benchmark across all data sources, i.e. the 2006 base year
description of the U.S. economy is calibrated to a set of regional and state-level SAM accounts
that are consistent with observed (and simulated) generator-level electricity production and
household consumption and income patterns as represented in the 2006 CEX data. Calibration of
electricity demand for regulated and wholesale markets ensures that the model perfectly matches
observed electricity output. However, benchmark utilization of technologies, fuel use, and hence
benchmark carbon emissions are simulated based on relative costs of each generator.
First, we compare observed output per fuel and technology reported in EIA Form 906-920
(2007d) with values simulated from our model. We find a R2 of 90.2 and 84.1% for regulated
operators and wholesale producers, respectively.20 Second, we compare simulated regional
wholesale prices with observed wholesale prices reported by FERC. Table 3 shows that simulated
and observed yearly load-weighted average wholesale prices are very close. For regulated
operators, comparable price data is not available.21 Finally, we compare simulated and observed
outcomes in terms of emissions intensity. The model accurately predicts carbon intensity for
wholesale producers (Table 3) and for regulated operators (Figure 3).
20 Formally, we compute: R2 = 1−
∑
tech,fuel(ytech,fuel−yˆtech,fuel)2∑
tech,fuel(ytech,fuel−y¯)2 where ytech,fuel is observed output for each technology-fuel
combination, yˆtech,fuel is the model prediction, and y¯ is the average observed outcome.
21 EIA form 826 (2007a) and EIA form 861 (2007c) provide revenue data for regulated operators in our dataset, but
no information is available that would allow us to separate out generation costs from transmission and distribution
costs at the operator level.
21
 0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Si
m
u
la
te
d
 t
C
O
2
/M
W
h
 
Observed tCO2/MWh 
45°
CA
ERCOT
MISO
MOUNT
NENGL
NWPP
NY
PJM
SEAST
SPP
Figure 3. Simulated and observed emission intensity for regulated operators.
Given the benchmark solution to the electricity sector model, our calibration procedure
involves three major steps. First, we benchmark the GE model to the baseline solution of the
electricity sub-model by using least-square optimization methods to re-estimate the Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM) data given electricity sector outputs and inputs. Second, we achieve
consistency of consumption choices by the single artificial agent and the aggregate of individual
household choices by calibrating preference parameters of the artificial agent based on observed
prices and consumption of real households. This procedure is described in Rutherford and Tarr
(2008) and further detailed in Appendix D. Third, as is customary in applied GE analysis, we use
prices and quantities of the integrated economic-energy data set for the base year to calibrate the
value share and level parameters in the model. Exogenous elasticities determine the free
parameters of the functional forms that capture production technologies and consumer
preferences. Reference values for elasticity parameters are shown in Table A3.
4.4.2 Decomposition Algorithm
All components of the integrated modeling framework are solved as a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP) (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995) where economic equilibrium is
characterized by two classes of conditions: zero profit and market clearance. The former
condition determines a vector of activity levels and the latter determines a vector of prices. We
formulate the problem in GAMS and use the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) to solve for
non-negative prices and quantities.
Given the highly non-linear nature and large dimensionality of the numerical problem at hand,
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an integrated solution approach is not feasible. We make use of recent advances in decomposition
methods to numerically compute the general equilibrium of the the integrated model
encompassing a generator-level description of electricity generation and a large number of
heterogenous households.
First, integration of the electric sector component in the GE setting is is based on a block
decomposition algorithm by Bo¨hringer and Rutherford (2009) that involves an iterative procedure
allowing to separately compute the electricity model from the GE model. For this purpose, the
supply of electricity in the GE model is treated as exogenous and is parametrized based on the
solution of electricity sub-model. A linear demand function for electricity is used in the
bottom-up model to locally approximate the demand response from the GE model. Convergence
between the two models is achieved by successively re-calibrating the linear demand function
based on the Marshallian price elasticity of demand and a candidate GE solution for electricity
price and demand.
In addition to the link for electricity supply and demand, both models are also fully reconciled
in terms of prices and demands for fuels, capital, labor, and other commodities and services used
to produce electricity. These additional linkages are implemented by using candidate GE prices to
parametrize the electricity sector model, and by updating exogenous demands for these
commodities in the GE model based on the previous solution of the electricity sector model.
Appendix C describes the implementation of the algorithm.
Integration of the GE and electricity sector model also require capturing profits earned by
non-regulated electricity operators. There are two types of profits. First, generators with marginal
costs below the equilibrium price for electricity earn sub-marginal profits that reflect the shadow
value of installed capacity. Second, profits for Cournot players are due to markups on marginal
generation costs. Total profits are implicitly included in the GE model by valuing parameterized
electricity sector supplies and inputs at equilibrium market prices.
Second, as simultaneous solution methods are infeasible for the number of household we
consider, we use a decomposition algorithm by Rutherford and Tarr (2008) to integrate all
households endogenously within our general equilibrium model.The key idea of the algorithm is
to solve a market economy with many households through the computation of equilibria for a
sequence of representative agent (RA) economies. The algorithm decomposes the numerical
problem into two sub-problems and employs an iterative procedure between them to find the
equilibrium of the underlying model. The first sub-problem computes candidate equilibrium
prices from a version of the GE model where the household demand side in each region is
replaced by a single RA. The second sub-problem solves a partial equilibrium (PE) relaxation of
the underlying model by evaluating demand functions for each of the 15,588 households given
candidate GE prices from the RA problem. The iterative procedure between both sub-problems
involves the re-calibration of preferences of the RA in each region based on PE quantity choices
by ”real” households. This ensures that the GE prices derived from the RA model, which include
a mutually consistent GE response of firms and the demand by the RA, are consistent with PE
demand by individual households. Appendix D describes the implementation of the
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decomposition algorithm in the current context.
5. RESULTS
5.1 Allowance Allocation Design
In general equilibrium, allowance allocation designs translate into a statement about how the
carbon revenue is distributed among households. Formally, let T0 denote economy-wide CO2
emissions in the benchmark, τ the equilibrium allowance price, ξ the emissions reduction target
imposed by the CAT regulation (expressed as a fraction of benchmark emissions), and ϑ is the
fraction of allowances retained by the government to achieve budget neutrality.22 We can write
the carbon revenue received by consumer h as:
Ah = τξT0(ah + bh + ch) · (1− ϑ) , (22)
where ah, bh, and ch denotes a household’s share of carbon revenue from allocating allowances to
non-electricity sectors, to non-regulated electricity producers, and regulated electricity producers,
respectively. Further define λm, the share of allowances allocated to electricity market m = f ∪ r,
as a linear combination of the share of benchmark electricity emissions, Em, and benchmark
electricity output, O:
λm = αE
Em∑
m′ Em′
+ (1− αE) Om∑
m′ Om′
, (23)
where αE ∈ [0, 1].
We now formulate our counterfactual policy scenarios in terms of parameters ah, bh, and ch.
Regarding allowances distributed to regulated electricity firms, we consider the following three
scenarios:
• LUMPSUM: αE = 1, ch = υhw
∑
f λfIr,h
• SUB E: αE = 1, ch = 0
• SUB O: αE = 0, ch = 0,
where υh denotes the population weight of household h in total population and If,h is an indicator
variable which is equal to one if household h is a consumer in market f , zero otherwise.
The LUMPSUM scenario represents a CAT policy where free allowances are allocated based
on benchmark emissions and where the PUCs require regulated operators pass on the allowance
value to households as a lump-sum transfer on a per-capita basis.23 Alternatively, LUMPSUM can
be viewed as a CAT policy where allowances are auctioned and revenue is distributed as
per-capita lump sum transfers. While other lump-sum transfer schemes that are independent of
electricity consumption are conceivable per capita transfers are often seen as politically most
22 In each scenario, we determine the amount of allowances required to compensate for changes in non-CO2 tax
revenue. This corresponds to a non-distortionary lump-sum tax and ensures that the budget of the government
remains constant across all counterfactual equilibria.
23 We do not include the case αE = 0 and ch = υhw
∑
f λfIr,h as results are similar to those obtained for LUMP-
SUM.
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acceptable. Further, it seem plausible to rule out that PUCs would base the distribution of
transfers explicitly on other household characteristics.
The SUB E and SUB O cases represent policies where free allowances are allocated based on
benchmark emissions or output, respectively, and where each regulated electricity operators use
the value of allowances received to subsidize its electricity rate. The two SUB scenarios reflect a
situation where CAT regulation is aimed at sheltering some electricity consumers from adverse
price impacts or where the intent of the legislation to have electricity prices reflect the full CO2
costs is frustrated by PUC rate setting. The value of allowances allocated to regulated producer f
in the SUB cases is given by Vf = τλfw and determines the firm-specific endogenous subsidy
rate sf according to Eq. (6).
To identify the incidence of free allowances allocation to regulated electricity producers, in all
scenarios non-electricity sectors and non-regulated electricity producers receive free allowances
based on benchmark emissions. This reflects a case where windfall gains accrue to capital
owners:
ah = κh(1− w) (24)
bh = κhw
∑
r
λr , (25)
where w =
∑
mEm/T0 is the share of emissions from electricity sector in country-wide
emissions and κh is the share of capital income of household h in aggregate capital income.
While this is an imperfect approximation to capital ownership, keeping the policy treatment
assigned to other sectors constant allows us to focus our attention to the incidence of SUB E and
SUB O scenarios relative to the LUMPSUM scenario.
5.2 Aggregate Impacts
Figure 4 and Table 8 summarize the impacts of allowance allocation schemes on national
welfare (net of welfare impacts from environmental changes). Aggregate welfare costs are the
weighted average of each household’s equivalent variation (EV) as a percentage of full income,
where a household’s weight is proportional to its share of the total population. If the value of
freely allocated allowances is passed on to consumers through a subsidy of electricity rates, the
welfare costs of the policy are between 1.4 and 1.8 times higher than if the value is transferred to
consumers in a lump-sum fashion. For a 20% reduction target, this is equivalent to an additional
burden of around US$50 billion.
If regulated electricity producers are allowed to pass the value of free permits through
electricity rates, a fraction of consumers do not see the carbon price signal. This leads to
sub-optimal (i.e. too high) electricity consumption and CO2 emissions from regulated electricity
operators. A key driver of efficiency costs is the size of electricity price changes. While we find
that the difference in average electricity price increase is modest, heterogeneity in generation
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Figure 4. National-level mean welfare impacts and CO2 abatement (a). Excess welfare costs relative to
LUMPSUM (b).
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Table 8. Compliance costs, carbon prices, and sectoral CO2 abatement under alternative designs of
cap-and-trade policy.
LUMPSUM SUB E SUB O
Reduction target (%) 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30
Compliance costa
Total ($billion) 34.4 83.0 155.3 60.4 129.9 213.0 57.4 124.7 206.5
Per avoided ton of CO2 ($) 58.8 70.9 88.4 103.8 111.4 121.6 98.4 106.8 117.8
Carbon price ($ per ton) 14.1 31.2 51.3 18.9 40.5 63.2 17.3 37.4 60.0
Electricity price (%) 19.1 43.9 73.2 13.7 33.9 59.9 15.3 36.8 62.9
Sectoral abatement
Economy-wide (million tons) 585 1,170 1,756 585 1,170 1,756 585 1,170 1,756
Sectoral contribution (%)
Regulated electricity (%) 38.1 38.9 38.8 19.3 23.7 28.8 25.3 27.9 31.4
Wholesale electricity (%) 11.0 14.0 16.5 17.8 20.5 20.8 15.8 19.1 19.7
Non-electricity sectors (%) 50.9 47.1 44.7 63.0 55.8 50.4 58.9 53.0 48.9
Notes: aNegative of the weighted sum of equivalent variations of each household. bEmissions reductions relative to
benchmark.
technology portfolio at the operator level gives rises to large heterogeneity for market level price
impacts. We summarize the distribution of operator-level electricity price changes (net of
transmission and distribution costs) in Figure 5.
In the LUMPSUM scenario, the average price increase across the U.S. is around 40% for
regulated operators, and 20% for non-regulated operators. This reflects the higher carbon
intensity of regulated producers, but also the lower substitution possibilities among technologies
(mainly from coal to natural gas), as regulated operators typically hold a much smaller set of
generators compared to the set of generators active on wholesale markets. The model suggests a
substantial dispersion of price impacts across markets, ranging from about zero for producers
with low carbon intensity to almost 250 percent for operators holding a portfolio of coal-fired
plants and with relatively low electricity prices in the benchmark. The dispersion of price impacts
across regions varies depending on the underlying dispersion in carbon intensity among operators
in our data.
Subsidizing electricity prices drastically reduces both the mean and the dispersion of price
changes. Under an emissions-based subsidy, the maximum price increase falls to about 50%.
Under an output-based subsidy, the subsidy rate is identical among regulated operators, so that the
price increase at operators with carbon-intensive technologies falls in between price changes
under LUMPSUM and the SUB E cases. In regulated markets with large output and low carbon
technologies, operators can be overcompensated by the subsidy therefore inducing a negative
change in electricity prices.
Allocating allowances based on benchmark output induces smaller distortions of the carbon
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Figure 5. Distribution of electricity price changes by region (ξ = 0.8). For each region, the box-whisker
plots from left to right refer to the LUMPSUM, SUB O, and SUB E cases, respectively. The whiskers
show outlier values at the 5th and 95th percentile, respectively.
price, increasing incentives to abate at operators with high carbon intensity and reducing
aggregate welfare costs. While the distribution of price impacts under emissions- and
output-based allocation is different, aggregate price impacts is very similar for both allocation
rules, so that differences in aggregate welfare costs are small. Moreover, as the stringency of the
policy increases, inefficiencies relative to LUMPSUM represent a smaller share of total
compliance costs, and differences between allocation rules become smaller.
The second key driver of efficiency costs is differences in abatement costs across sectors. Our
data sugggest that electricity generation at regulated operators is—on average—relatively carbon
intensive and that abatement is relatively cheap. Under the SUB E and SUB O scenarios,
regulated operators are required to surrender permits to cover their emissions, and cost
minimizing behavior implies that they respond to the opportunity cost of permits by reducing
emissions. But without a distorted carbon price signal the reduction in electricity consumption is
smaller. For a 20% cap on economy-wide emissions, regulated electricity producers contribute to
about 39% of emissions reductions under LUMPSUM, while this number drops to 23 and 28%
under SUB E and SUB O, respectively. The increase in the demand for emission permits raises
the equilibrium carbon price consistent with incentivizing sub-optimally large levels of abatement
in the wholesale electricity and non-electricity sectors. The contribution of non-regulated
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Table 9. Efficiency cost, subsidy rate, and CO2 emissions by region (ξ = 0.8).
∆ Welfare Subsidy rate ∆ CO2 emissions
rel. to LUMPSUM (%)a (cents/kWh)b rel. to LUMPSUM (%)a
SUB E SUB O SUB E SUB O SUB E SUB O
MOUNT -0.99 -0.90 1.2 1.0 3.2 2.2
SPP -0.90 -0.82 1.3 0.9 4.8 2.7
SEAST -0.65 -0.63 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.7
MISO -0.41 -0.37 1.2 0.8 3.7 1.9
NWPP -0.31 -0.28 0.5 0.8 -0.2 -1.0
PJM -0.23 -0.21 0.6 0.4 -1.4 -1.4
ERCOT -0.13 -0.11 0.2 0.1 -4.5 -3.5
NY -0.11 -0.09 0.3 0.3 -2.9 -1.8
CA -0.09 -0.07 0.2 0.5 -2.8 -1.2
NENGL -0.07 -0.05 0.1 0.1 -2.5 -1.8
Notes: aDifference in percentage points of percentage mean welfare changes under LUMPSUM relative to
SUB E/SUB O. bOutput-weighted average across regulated electricity producers in each region.
electricity producers increases from 14% under LUMPSUM to about 20% under both subsidy
cases. Similarly, non-electricity sectors contribute about 47% of total abatement under
LUMPSUM while their share increases to 56 and 53% under SUB E and SUB O, respectively.
5.3 Distributional Impacts
Regional Welfare Impacts and Subsidy Rates. Table 9 summarizes regional welfare
changes relative to LUMPSUM allowance allocation design and the regional subsidy rate to
consumers of regulated electricity (in cents/kWh) for a 20% target. The pattern of regional
welfare losses correlates closely with the magnitude of subsidy rates. This indicates that the value
of allowances allocated to regulated firms in a given region, expressed per unit of electricity
output, is a strong driver of regional costs. On average, regions with the highest share of
electricity produced under cost-of-service regulation—SEAST, SPP, MOUNT—suffer relatively
large adverse welfare impacts from subsidizing electricity prices, while regions with a low degree
of regulation—NENGL, ERCOT, NY, PJM—experience the smallest losses.
Another driver for the distribution of regional welfare impacts is the benchmark carbon
intensity of regulated electricity generation. For example, although a relatively high share of
electricity in CA is produced under regulation, it only experiences the second smallest welfare
impact as it uses the least amount of CO2 per kWh of electricity generated among all regions.
This can be explained by the hydroelectric capacity in that state that is still under regulation.
Conversely, despite the fact that the SEAST is characterized by the largest share of electricity
produced under regulation, it only ranks third in terms of welfare losses as its carbon intensity is
below the national average.
An allocation rule based on output is not directly tied to CO2 emissions, generally creating
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smaller subsidy rates and partly preserving the carbon price signal. However, while the
emissions- and output-based allocation schemes generate noticeable differences in the size of
regional subsidy rates, both schemes result in very similar outcomes in terms of the regional
distribution of welfare impacts—as for the national level results, the SUB E scenarios leads to
slightly larger costs compared to the SUB O.
Regional and Sectoral CO2 Abatement. The last two columns of Table 9 show changes in
total CO2 emissions by region relative to LUMPSUM. When electricity prices are subsidized,
heavily regulated regions with a high carbon intensity—MOUNT, SPP, SEAST, MISO—emit
between 1 and 5% more. Consistent with the country-level cap, other regions—CA, NENGL, NY,
NWPP and PJM—abate more by up to 3%. An output-based subsidy generally leads to a smaller
redistribution of abatement efforts among regions relative to LUMPSUM. In only two regions
emissions are higher under the SUB O as compared to SUB E: SEAST, which hosts a relatively
small number of regulated operators with very large output and low emissions, and NWPP, where
a few regulated operators hold very large hydro resources.
We further breakdown the change in total CO2 emissions by region in Figure 6, reporting
emissions changes relative to LUMPSUM associated with production decisions in three
aggregated sectors: regulated electricity generation, electricity sold on wholesale markets, and
non-electricity sectors comprising the rest of the economy. In most regions, a subsidy forces more
reductions in wholesale electricity and non-electricity sectors. The only exceptions are: (i)
SUB O in NWPP, where regulated operators mainly hold hydro resources, so that increased
demand for subsidized output does not raise emissions; (ii) SUB O in NENGL, where most
regulated operators lose market shares to the wholesale producers; and (iii) both subsidy schemes
in MOUNT, where trade effects compensate demand reductions. For most regions, however, more
than a half of the redirected abatement comes from non-electricity sectors. This underlines the
importance of using an economy-wide framework that includes a representation of abatement
opportunities in non-electricity sectors of the economy.
Mean Household Impacts across Income. Table 10 displays the mean welfare impacts by
income group expressed as the difference in percentage points of welfare changes under SUB E
and SUB O relative to LUMPSUM. In the bottom 80% of the income distribution, both
emissions- and output-based allocation schemes are slightly regressive with burdens ranging from
-0.5% in the bottom decile to -0.25% in the eighth decile. For the top two deciles, the policies are
slightly progressive with impacts of -.40 percent for the SUB E case. Welfare impacts expressed
in dollars per household are more negative for higher-income households with burdens ranging
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Figure 6. Sectoral decomposition of percentage change in CO2 emissions by region (absolute difference
with LUMPSUM, ξ = 0.8). For a given region, sum of changes across sectors corresponds to
percentage change in total CO2 emissions reported in Table 9.
from $76 for the bottom decile to $676 for the top decile.24 The SUB O scenario shows slightly
smaller welfare losses compared to SUB E but a similar pattern across income groups.
The humped shaped profile of mean impacts across income deciles for the SUB E and SUB O
cases (relative to LUMPSUM) is not an immediately intuitive result as one would expect that
subsidizing electricity prices disproportionately benefits lower-income households who spend a
larger fraction of their budget on electricity (see first column in Table 6). There are two factors
that explain this result. First, removing the per-capita lump-sum transfers has an regressive effect
for lower-income households, i.e. the value of lowered electricity rates in the subsidy cases does
not fully compensate for the loss of transfer income that is received in the LUMPSUM case.
Second, in a general equilibrium setting the effect of carbon pricing on welfare will also strongly
depend on changes in factor prices, and the relative importance of uses versus source side effects
of income. Households which rely heavily on factors whose prices fall relative to other factor
prices will be adversely impacted. In our model, the policy increases the relative price of capital
24 One caveat of our analysis is the use of annual income. It is recognized in the literature (see, for example, Davies
et al., 1984; Poterba, 1989, 1991; Bull et al., 1994; and Lyon and Schwab, 1995) that consumption taxes—
including energy taxes—look considerably less regressive when lifetime income measures are used than when
annual income measures are used. The lifetime income approach, however, relies on strong assumptions about
household consumption decisions. In particular it assumes that households base current consumption decisions
knowing their full stream of earnings over their lifetime. Based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey and using
proxies for lifetime income Rausch et al. (2011) find that the use of annual income does not strongly bias results
toward regressivity.
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Table 10. Mean welfare impacts across income groups (SUB E relative to LUMPSUM, ξ = 0.8).
Income decile SUB E SUB O
%a $ per householdb %a $ per householdb
1 -0.50 -76 -0.50 -77
2 -0.34 -91 -0.34 -90
3 -0.32 -111 -0.31 -108
4 -0.32 -136 -0.29 -127
5 -0.29 -151 -0.26 -139
6 -0.29 -182 -0.26 -163
7 -0.30 -220 -0.26 -194
8 -0.29 -253 -0.25 -220
9 -0.34 -362 -0.29 -308
10 -0.46 -676 -0.38 -564
All -0.34 -227 -0.31 -200
Notes: aDifference in percentage points of population-weighted within-income group percentage welfare changes
under SUB E relative to LUMPSUM. bPopulation-weighted within-income group average of equivalent variation
expressed in 2006$ relative to LUMPSUM (absolute difference).
to labor ( r
w
) as perfectly mobile capital is a better substitute for carbon than labor which is mobile
across sectors within a given region but not across regions. Subsidizing electricity in regulated
markets then leads to smaller increases in r
w
relative to LUMPSUM, i.e. the following pattern is
observed: r
w SUB E <
r
w SUB O <
r
wLUMPSUM. This suggests that lower-income households and those
in the top two income deciles—who rely more heavily on capital income (relative to labor
income) are more adversely impacted on the sources side of income compared to middle income
households. Efficiency costs from freely allocating allowances in the presence of a
price-regulated electricity sector are therefore disproportionately borne by capital owners, and
benefits to consumers in the form of lowered energy prices are dominated by the sources side
effects of income.
Heterogeneity in Household Impacts. Focusing on mean household impacts at the national
level masks important variation in impacts across and within regions and income groups. Figure
7 and Figure 8 show box-whisker plots for individual household impacts by region and income
quintile for the LUMPSUM case relative to the “no-policy” benchmark and for SUB E relative to
LUMPSUM, respectively. We show graphs for SEAST, NWPP, and PJM because the patterns of
household impacts in those regions is representative of other regions with a high, intermediate,
and low degree of regulation in the electricity sector. The key insights are as follows.
First, it is important to note that focusing on averages across income groups obscures
important variation within income groups that may swamp the variation in average effects across
income groups. The variation within income groups is driven by differences among households
with respect to expenditure shares on energy and income patterns.
Second, looking at impacts under LUMPSUM relative to a “no-policy” benchmark (Figure 7)
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Figure 7. Regional within-income quintile distribution of percentage change of equivalent variation under
LUMPSUM (relative to no policy case, ξ = 0.8). The whiskers show outlier values at the 5th and 95th
percentile, respectively. SEAST, NWPP, and PJM represent a region with high, medium, and low
degree of regulation in the electricity sector, respectively.
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Figure 8. Regional within-income quintile distribution of percentage point difference in welfare impacts
under SUB E relative to LUMPSUM ( ξ = 0.8). The whiskers show outlier values at the 5th and 95th
percentile, respectively. SEAST, NWPP, and PJM represent a region with high, medium, and low
degree of regulation in the electricity sector, respectively.
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shows an U-shaped profile of mean impacts across income quintiles. This is largely a result of
how the allowance revenue is allocated. Distributing the value of free allowances allocated to
regulated electricity producers on a per-capita lump-sum basis is progressive disproportionately
benefiting lower-income households. As the remainder of the carbon revenue is distributed in
proportion to capital income, lower-income households and higher-income households are
relatively better off. We observe a similar pattern of impacts for the SUB E case relative to a
“no-policy” benchmark (not shown).
Third, a significant fraction of households gain from the carbon policy as the allowance
allocation overcompensates adverse impacts felt through higher energy prices and reduced factor
income. It is mostly households in the first and fifth quintile that gain as they benefit from the
allocation scheme. In addition to income, households that gain also show (i) above-average shares
of transfer income that insulates them from adverse effects on the sources side of income and (ii)
below-average embodied carbon in consumption.
Fourth, the mean impacts by income quintile of SUB E relative to LUMPSUM (Figure 8)
follow an inverted U-shaped profile for highly regulated regions (here represented by SEAST) and
a more neutral or slightly U-shaped profile for regions with low regulation in the electricity sector
(here represented by NWPP and PJM). Larger impacts for higher-income households in highly
regulated regions compared to regions with low regulation can be explained by larger reductions
in the price of capital (relative to labor) under SUB E relative to LUMPSUM in these regions.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Here we consider the sensitivity of results to parameters affecting the integration of electricity
markets both within and across ISO regions. Market integration can affect the size and regional
distribution of efficiency costs associated subsidized electricity prices. First, many regulated
operators trade power with independent operators, and substituting wholesale power for carbon
intensive generation provides a different channel of reducing CO2 emissions. Thus inter-operator
trades can potentially induce different abatement decisions among regulated and wholesale
producers of electricity. Integration between regulated and non-regulated operators is represented
by the parameter σ (see Eq. (19)). A second important aspect of market integration relates to
inter-regional trades across ISOs, represented by σxELE (see Eq. (15)).
In the first panel in Table 11, we summarize efficiency and distributional impacts of SUB E
and SUB O for our central assumption regarding market integration parameters. Panel two shows
results for a low market integration case. Reducing trade opportunities among regulated and
non-regulated operators slightly increases carbon prices as flexibility to exploit relatively cheap
abatement are scarcer. Abatement at regulated operators declines, and compliance costs increase.
An increase fragmentation of the electricity sector also increases somewhat the dispersion of
mean regional welfare impacts.
Results for higher market integration in the third panel suggests that our results are very robust
with respect to varying σ. The impact works in the other direction compared to the low market
integration case, but follows the same intuition.
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Table 11. Impacts of different cap-and-trade designs under alternative parameter assumptions.
Standard deviation of
EV Carbon price Abatement EV Mean EV Electricity Mean electricity
(%) (2006$/tCO2) reg. ele. (%) by region price change price change
by region
Central case (σ = 1, σxELE = 0.5)
SUM E -0.58 29.1 12.2 0.79 0.13 0.21 0.09
SUM O -0.59 26.8 15.1 0.79 0.15 0.34 0.12
Low market integration (σ = 0)
SUM E -0.59 29.8 11.3 0.74 0.15 0.26 0.09
SUM O -0.61 28.4 12.3 0.77 0.17 0.65 0.12
High market integration (σ = 10)
SUM E -0.55 28.6 12.0 0.73 0.12 0.21 0.09
SUM O -0.58 26.0 15.1 0.77 0.14 0.33 0.12
High market integration (σ = 10) and high electricity trade elasticity (σxELE = 5)
SUM E -0.52 27.8 13.2 0.69 0.11 0.19 0.08
SUM O -0.55 25.4 16.4 0.73 0.13 0.30 0.10
Notes: Results shown for ξ = 0.8.
The bottom panel explores the case of high integration within and across regions, and is
designed to provide an upper bound of the model response. As for the other cases before, our
conclusions are unaffected. Carbon prices are lower compared to the central case translating into
a smaller allowance value and lower subsidy rates. As regulated electricity producers are, on
average, more carbon intensive, increased trade opportunities induce higher abatement as
compared to the central case. Moreover, abatement is cheaper, which implies slightly smaller
efficiency costs. Increased market integration also reduces the dispersion of regional welfare and
electricity price impacts, reflecting realized trade opportunities.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the impacts of alternative allowance allocation designs of CAT policy
in the presence of price-regulated electricity markets. The model links a detailed representation of
electricity generation technologies and markets as well as data capturing household heterogeneity
with a general equilibrium representation of the U.S. economy. This framework enables us to
account for the technology response at the operator-level, market structure, and economy-wide
effects, and permits assessment of the distributional and efficiency impacts of environmental
regulation using theoretically sound welfare cost metrics.
We find that compliance costs of the policy substantially increase if the value of free
allowances is not reflected in electricity rates of electricity producers under cost-of-service
regulation. Depending on the stringency of the emissions reduction target, our analysis suggests
that compliance costs of a federal CAT regulation are between 40 and 80% higher if the value of
36
free allowances allocated to regulated electricity producers is passed on to consumers through
electricity rates.
The choice between auctioning or free allocation of allowances in a cap-and-trade system also
crucially influences the regional distribution of welfare costs. Regions with a large degree of
electricity market regulation and high carbon intensity of electricity production suffer the most
adverse impacts. In contrast, regions with largely deregulated electricity sectors and substantial
electricity imports benefit from lower electricity rates as the policy creates relatively small
distortions within their regional economies while lowering the out-of-state price of electricity. An
emissions-based scheme brings about a slightly higher welfare loss as compared to an
output-based scheme, but the choice of how allowances are allocated only has a small impact on
overall economic costs.
We find that alternative policy designs have widely differing implications for local electricity
prices. For a 20% economy-wide cap in terms of CO2 emissions, electricity price increases can be
as high as 250% if allowance are auctioned. The large variation can be explained by the
heterogeneity of the technology portfolio at the operator level. If freely allocated allowances are
used to subsidize electricity rates at regulated operators, the variance of electricity price impacts
is reduced drastically.
Contrary to what one might expect, subsidizing electricity prices does not disproportionately
benefit lower-income households (who spend a large fraction of their income on electricity).
Instead, the efficiency costs due to the failure to pass through the carbon price signal to consumers
are borne largely by households with low and high incomes. This result can be traced back to the
incidence of sources side effects of income that overcompensate potentially progressive uses side
effects of income. Differences in mean welfare impacts across income groups are larger for
regions with a large degree of regulation in the electricity sector as sources side effects of income
are more pronounced in these regions. Mean welfare impacts across income groups are neutral to
slightly progressive in regions in which electricity markets are subject to relatively little
regulation. Finally, exploiting household heterogeneity in terms of income sources as well as
preferences over different commodities—based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey data
set—we find substantial variation in within-income group household impacts. This suggests that
focusing on averages across income groups obscures important variation within income groups
that may swamp the variation in average effects across income groups.
We conclude this paper by highlighting that our static modeling framework cannot address the
question of investment in low-carbon generation technologies. Given that regulated operators can
expect a predetermined rate of return on investments, incentives for investments differ as
compared to non-regulated operators. However, the issue analyzed in this paper is likely to be
even more important in a dynamic setting, as the perception of the carbon price by consumers will
incentivize investments in energy saving technologies, and the welfare costs of subsidizing
electricity rates is thus likely to increase as time passes.
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APPENDIX A: Supplemental Figures and Tables
Table A1. Definition of electricity pools
Regions States
Western Electricity Coordinating Council
California ISO (CA) Most of California
Northwest Power Pool (NWPP) All of Idaho, Oregon, Utah, Washington; most of
Montana, Nevada, Wyoming; parts of California
Mountain Power Area (MOUNT) All of Arizona, Colorado; parts of Nevada, New
Mexico, South Dakota, Wyoming
Eastern Interconnection
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) All of Kansas, Oklahoma; most of Nebraska; parts
of Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, New
Mexico, Texas
Midwest ISO (MISO) All of Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Wisconsin; most of Illinois, Indiana, Mis-
souri, South Dakota; parts of Kentucky, Montana,
Ohio.
Southeast Power Pool (SEAST) All of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee; most of
Arkansas, Louisiana; parts of Kentucky, Missouri,
Texas.
PJM Interconnection (PJM) All of Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland,
New Jersey, Virginia, West Virginia; most of Ohio,
Pennsylvania; parts of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, North Carolina, Tennessee.
New York ISO (NY) All of New York
New England ISO (NENGL) All of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont
Electric Reliability Council of Texas
Texas (ERCOT) Most of Texas
Source: http://www.ferc.gov.
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Table A2. List of Generation Technologies and Fuels in the Electricity Generation Model
Technologies
Combined cycle, combustion turbine, hydraulic turbine, internal combustion engine, photovoltaic,
steam turbine, wind turbine
Fuels
Coal:
Anthracite and bituminous coal, lignite coal, coal-based synfuel,
sub-bituminous coal, waste and other coal
Natural gas:
Blast furnace gas, natural gas, other gas, gaseous propane
Oil:
Distillate fuel oil, jet fuel, kerosene, residual fuel oil
Other:
Agricultural crop, other biomass (gas, liquids, solids), black liquor,
geothermal, landfill gas, municipal solid waste, nuclear fission,
petroleum coke, other wastes, solar, wood and wood waste,
wind, hydroelectric
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APPENDIX B: Equilibrium Conditions for GE Model
This section lays out the equilibrium conditions for the economy-wide model. Our
complementarity-based formulation of the economy-wide model distinguishes three classes of
conditions that characterize the competitive equilibrium: zero-profit conditions, market clearance
conditions, and income balance.25 The zero-profit conditions determine a vector of activity levels
(z) and the market clearance conditions determine a vector of prices (p).
Zero profit. Let ΠXir (p) denote the unit profit function of industry i in region r which is
calculated as the difference between unit revenue (Rir) and unit costs (Cir) where:
Cir(p) = min{plrLi+pkKi+pzrRzi+
∑
j
pjrxji | Fir(Lir, Kir, Rzir;x1ir, . . . , x10ir) = 1} (26)
Rir(p) = max{
∑
j
pirXir | Xir = 1} . (27)
Zero profits implies that no production activity makes positive profits, i.e.:
−ΠXir (p) = Cir −Rir ≥ 0 ⊥ Xir . (28)
Similar conditions hold for Armington aggregation (Πxi r).
Market clearance. The second class of equilibrium conditions is that at equilibrium prices and
activity levels, the supply of any commodity must balance or exceed demand. For regional output
markets we can express this condition as:
Yir ≥
∑
j
xjr
∂Πxjr(p)
∂pYir
⊥ pYir (29)
where pYir is the price of Yir. The market for Armington good i is in balance if:
xir ≥
∑
j
Yjr
∂ΠYjr(p)
∂pxir
+
∂pIr
∂pxir
Ir +
∂pxGP
∂pxir
GP + dir(p,Mr) ⊥ pxir (30)
where by Shephard’s Lemma the first three summands on the right-hand side represent the
demand of good i by the constant returns to scale production, investment, and government sectors,
respectively. Final demands dir(p,Mr) are derived from the budget-constrained maximization:
dir(p,Mr) = argmax{U(x1r, . . . , x10r, q, w, l) |
∑
i
pxirxir + p
q
rq + p
w
r w + p
l
rl = Mr} (31)
where U(·) is a CES utility index and exhibits local non-satiation. Market clearance conditions
for labor, capital, and natural resources are given by:∑
j
Yj
∂ΠYjr(p)
∂pfr
+ dfr(p,Mr) ≥
∑
ωfr ⊥ pfr (32)
25 The third condition simplifies implementation and may be substituted out of the model without altering the basic
logic (as in Mathiesen, 1985).
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where f = {k, l; 1, . . . , Z} denotes the set for primary production factors (labor, capital, and
natural resources). Market clearance conditions requiring balanced intra-national trade for
non-energy goods that are traded on a bilateral basis are omitted here for simplicity.
Foreign closure of the model is warranted through a national balance-of-payments constraint
which determines the price of foreign exchange:∑
i
EXi +B =
∑
i
IMi
∂pdfmi
∂pfx
⊥ pfx (33)
where EX and IM denote the level of foreign exports and imports, respectively.
Income balance. The income balance conditions are given by equation (21).
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APPENDIX C: Decomposition Algorithms
Integration of Electricity Model in GE Framework. This section provides an algebraic
description of the integrated model.26 Let n = 1, . . . , N denote an iteration index and consider
first the economy-wide component. The least-cost input requirements obtained from solving the
electricity generation model in iteration (n− 1) are used to parameterize the general equilibrium
model in (n). This is accomplished by defining the market clearing condition for electricity (29)
as: ∑
g,t
Y g
(n−1)
t ≥
∑
j
x
(n)
jr
∂Πx
(n)
jr (p)
∂pY
(n)
ir
⊥ pY (n)ir i = ele (34)
where the left-hand side represents electricity supply as defined in (41). Demand for input i
comprising fuels and other materials by the electricity sector is accommodated through:
Y
(n)
ir ≥
∑
j
x
(n)
jr
∂Πx
(n)
jr (p)
∂pY
(n)
ir
+
∑
g,t
φci c
g Y g
(n−1)
t ⊥ pY
(n)
ir (35)
where φfi and φ
c
i represent the benchmark value share of good i in variable generation costs.
Factor market conditions (32) for capital and labor are modified according to:
∑
j
Y
(n)
j
∂Π
(n)
jr (p)
∂pf
(n)
r
+ d
(n)
fr (p,Mr) +
∑
g,t
φcf c
g Y g
(n−1)
t ≥
∑
ωfr ⊥ pfr (36)
In addition, we modify the income balance (21) to account for technology-specific rents and
profits (ΠELEr ):
M (n)r = p
k(n)ωkr + p
l(n)
r ω
l
r +
∑
z
pz
(n)
r ω
z
r + T
(n)
r + Π
ELE(n)
r . (37)
Electricity-sector output and inputs are valued implicitly at market prices, and hence we do not
need to include capacity rents and profits explicitly in the economy-wide model:
ΠELE
(n)
r =
∑
g∈r
∑
t
Y g
(n−1)
t
(
pY
(n)
ele,r P
r(n−1) − P c(n)r cg
)
(38)
where the price indexes for variable generation costs are updated according to:
P f
(n)
r =
∑
f
φff p
f (n)
r
26 Before applying the algorithm, we reconcile the benchmark datasets of the two models. Initial agreement in the
benchmark is achieved if electricity sector outputs and inputs over all regions and generators are consistent with
the aggregate representation of the electricity sector in the SAM data that underlies the GE framework. This step
is necessary to ensure that in the absence of a policy shock iterating between both sub-models always returns the
no-policy benchmark equilibrium. The calibration procedure is described in Lanz and Rausch (2011).
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P c
(n)
r =
∑
i
φci p
Y (n)
ir +
∑
f
φcf p
f (n)
r ,
respectively.
In the electricity generation model, the demand schedules are parameterized to locally
approximate the response of the top-down model. In each iteration step, the linear function is
re-calibrated to price and quantities derived from the top-down solution. Hence the demand
function for a regulated operator f in iteration n (compare with (7)) is updated according to:
Df
(n)
= D
f (n)
ζf
(n)
(
1 + 
(
P f
(n)
P
f (n)
ξf (n)
− 1
))
(39)
where
ζf
(n)
=
∑
j
x
(n)
jr
∂Πx
(n)
jr (p)
∂pY
(n)
ir
D
f (0)
, f ∈ r
ξf
(n)
= pY
(n)
ele,r P
f (0)
, f ∈ r
are scale factors that are based on the nth solution of the economy-wide model, and reference
demand (Df (0)) and price (P
f (0)
). A similar updating rule applies to wholesale electricity demand
in (12).
Finally, using the updated variable cost indexes, the revised unit profit functions for Cournot
players and for price takers in iteration (n) are given by:
pig
(n)
t =
 pr
(n)
t +
∂Dr
(n)
(prt )
−1
∂Y g
(n)
t
− P c(n)r cg − µg(n)t if g ∈ r is a Cournot player
pr
(n)
t − P c(n)r cg − µg
(n)
t if g ∈ r is a price taker .
(40)
Non-negative profits and average cost pricing conditions for regulated operators in iteration (n)
are given by:
P c
(n)
cg ≥ Cf (n)t ⊥ Y g
(n)
t ≥ 0 , (41)
P f
(n)
=
∑
g∈Gf
∑
t P
c(n) Y g
(n)
t c
g
Df (n)
. (42)
Integration of Heterogeneous Households in GE Framework. To illustrate the key idea of
the algorithm, we develop the following notation for nested utility functions. Let the quantity
choices be denoted by qi, for i = 1, . . . , I , corresponding to commodities with prices pi,
respectively. The utility tree consists of N + 1 levels, n = 0, 1, . . . , N ; on each level we
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distinguish several utility components. At the highest level (indicated by n = N ) of the utility
tree there is only one component, which corresponds to overall utility; this component is a
function of utility components at the next-lower level n = N − 1. These utility components at
N − 1 are in turn each a function of disjoint groups of utility components at the next lower level
N − 2, and so on. Finally, the utility components at level n = 1 are functions of the the
elementary utility components.
We specify the utility function for household h by specifying the utility components (for
simplicity we suppress the region index). We assume that all the utility components are linear
homogeneous CES-type functions of the associated components at the next lower level:
qhn,i =
∑
j∈i
θhn−1,j
(
qhn−1,j
q¯hn−1,j
)ρhn,i
1
ρh
n,i
, ρhn,i =
σhn,i − 1
σhn,i
, (43)
where j ∈ i is used to indicate the set of components qhn−1,j associated with qhn,i, and where σhn,i
denotes the elasticity of substitution between commodities j ∈ i. Note that we write the nested
utility function in calibrated share form (Rutherford, 1995); θ and q¯ denote the value share and
consumption in the benchmark equilibrium, respectively.
The decomposition algorithm is implemented by replacing in each region the household side
with an artificial representative agent (RA) whose utility function exhibits the identical structure
as household utility in Eq. (43):
Qn,i =
[∑
j∈i
Θn−1,j
(
Qn−1,j
Q¯n−1,j
)ρ˜n,i] 1ρ˜n,i
, ρ˜n,i =
σ˜n,i − 1
σ˜n,i
(44)
where Θn,j and Qn,j denote the respective counterparts for the RA to individual households as
defined in Eq. (43). A key insight from Rausch and Rutherford (2010) is that the choice of σ˜n,i is
entirely innocuous as this parameter bears no economic significance for the behavior of “real”
households in the underlying economic model (it can, however, affect the convergence speed of
the iterative solution procedure).
Given benchmark data on observable household demand q¯hi and prices p¯i, we initialize the RA
general equilibrium model such that commodity demands are consistent with the aggregate of
benchmark household demands. This is achieved by calibrating consumption (Q¯) and value share
(Θ) parameters as:
Q¯n,j =
H∑
h=1
q¯hn,j , (45)
Θn,j =
p¯n,jQ¯n,j∑
j′∈i p¯n,j′Q¯n,j′
. (46)
Solving for a carbon policy shock involves first solving the RA model to obtain a candidate vector
of general equilibrium prices pk. k denotes an iteration index. The second step solves a partial
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equilibrium relaxation of the underlying economy by evaluating household demand functions
qh,kn,i (pk, yk), where household income yk is updated sequentially at prices in iteration k. The key
step in each iteration involves “re-calibrating” preferences of the RA based on partial equilibrium
households’ quantity choices:
Q¯k+1n,i =
H∑
h=1
qh,kn,i (p
k, yk) , (47)
Θk+1n,j =
p¯kn,j
∑H
h=1 q
h,k
n,j (pk, yk)∑
j′∈i p¯
k
n,j′
∑H
h=1 q
h,k
n,j′(pk, yk)
. (48)
Note that this iterative procedure never alters preferences of the “real” households; it simply
“re-benchmarks” successively the utility function of the artificial representative household to be
consistent with the aggregated choices of individual households in each iteration.
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